By Tanveer Ahmad Meo

Introduction

In the evolving security architecture of South Asia and beyond, Pakistan faces growing strategic threats not only from its traditional rival India but increasingly from emerging alignments involving Israel. The convergence of India-Israel defense cooperation, rising Indian military assertiveness, and the proliferation of advanced surveillance and pre-emptive strike capabilities necessitate Pakistan to reassess and reinforce its nuclear deterrence posture. The development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) is emerging as a critical requirement—not merely as a symbol of strategic parity but as a practical step to secure Pakistan’s sovereignty, safeguard its territorial integrity, and ensure survivable second-strike capability.

The Strategic Threat Landscape: India and Israel Nexus

India’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) shield, ongoing hypersonic missile development, and naval expansion—supported by Israeli and Western technologies—have significantly undermined the efficacy of Pakistan’s existing deterrent based on medium-range systems like Shaheen-II and Ghauri.

Moreover, India’s strategic partnership with Israel has given it access to advanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities, satellite imaging, and anti-missile technology. This alliance is not theoretical—it has been operationalized through deals such as the supply of Israeli Phalcon AWACS, SPYDER air defense systems, and long-range drones. This evolving threat matrix poses a dual-front strategic challenge to Pakistan, requiring a sophisticated and resilient response.

Why Pakistan Needs ICBMs: A Defensive Imperative

1. Deterrence Across the Full Spectrum of Range
2. 
   Currently, Pakistan's longest-range missile, Shaheen-III (approx. 2,750 km), can reach the easternmost parts of India and the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. However, many Indian command and naval control centers, and strategic storage depots, lie beyond this range when considered in a real-time warfighting context involving dispersal and mobility.
   Some key examples include:
   Port Blair (Andaman & Nicobar Islands): Although Shaheen-III nominally reaches here, in case of dispersal to farther islands such as Car Nicobar or Campbell Bay, coverage becomes uncertain.

Southern Naval Command in Kochi, Kerala: Important for India’s naval readiness; lies at the edge of current missile reach.

Indian Space and Missile R&D sites in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, such as Sriharikota and Chitradurga, are critical to India’s future strike capabilities.

India’s Western command logistics and air bases in Thiruvananthapuram and Chennai fall at the extreme limit of existing coverage.

In the case of Israel, whose intelligence assets and possible covert strategic platforms may be used against Pakistan in a coalition scenario, the need to demonstrate retaliatory reach becomes even more essential.

2. Retaliatory Capability Against External Threats

If a conflict escalates or involves Israeli support in terms of satellite-based target acquisition, drone strikes, or even covert operations, Pakistan must possess the technical and doctrinal means to deter such support from distant external actors. An ICBM with a range of 7,000–10,000 km would:
Allow Pakistan to target Israeli strategic assets or signal capability to strike if it becomes an active party in a South Asian war.
Serve as a psychological and political deterrent against Israeli intelligence or cyber interference via India.
Extend deterrence toward military bases in Diego Garcia, which can potentially be used in collaboration with Indian or Western forces.

Second-Strike Credibility: ICBMs as a Strategic Backbone

ICBMs would form a vital component of Pakistan’s second-strike architecture, allowing it to retaliate even after absorbing a first strike. Their survivability, mobility, and deep inland basing increase the probability of successful retaliation.
Key contributions to second-strike capability include:
High survivability through underground silos or mobile platforms.
Launch-on-warning readiness based on real-time satellite or radar alerts.
Potential deployment with MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) for hitting multiple targets in a single strike.
Long flight times providing flexible political space for retaliation decisions, which short- and medium-range systems may not offer under rapid pre-emption threats.

India’s Missile Defense and Pakistan’s Response

India’s ballistic missile defense shield, bolstered by Israeli systems and Russian S-400s, is creating a strategic imbalance. Shorter-range Pakistani missiles may become vulnerable to interception, degrading deterrence credibility.

ICBMs, with high altitude, long-trajectory flight paths, and decoy or maneuverable re-entry vehicles, can penetrate BMD shields more effectively. They force the adversary to spread thin its interception resources across vast distances, increasing the chances of successful strike penetration.
Geo-Strategic Signaling : Pakistan’s Rightful Place in the Strategic Equation

Possessing an ICBM capability elevates Pakistan’s status to a full-spectrum deterrent power, putting it on strategic parity with nuclear peers like India and Israel. It serves as a signal to the international community that Pakistan is capable of defending its interests not only regionally but globally, if necessary.

It deters military adventurism by distant strategic actors.
It forces greater caution in forming hostile coalitions involving Pakistan.
It compels diplomatic engagement rather than strategic coercion.

Challenges and Cautions

Despite its advantages, ICBM development comes with constraints:
Cost-intensive : Infrastructure, fuel development, testing ranges, and command systems are expensive.
Diplomatic scrutiny : May attract criticism from the West and increased international pressure.
Risk of escalation : Must be accompanied by a transparent and responsible doctrine to prevent misunderstandings.

Conclusion

For Pakistan, the development of ICBMs is not an aggressive aspiration; it is a strategic necessity rooted in self-defense. The current missile inventory may not offer credible deterrence against advanced and geographically dispersed threats posed by the India-Israel nexus. ICBMs would provide the depth, flexibility, and survivability needed to ensure credible second-strike capability, thus deterring any coalition from contemplating a first strike or strategic coercion.

In a world where distance no longer guarantees safety, the ability to strike with precision and assurance beyond 7,000 km would send a clear message: Pakistan can and will defend itself—no matter the adversary, no matter the distance.